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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
danger inherent in permitting a counterclaim to be asserted in this
action is that a finding of personal liability on the part of the "repre-
sentative" plaintiff would serve to diminish the represented person's
recovery. In a wrongful death action, the personal representative's right
to recover "depends solely on the right of the injured person to recover,
... and although brought by the personal representative, accrues for
the benefit of the distributees. ' 247 Any recovery in a cause of action for
personal injuries becomes part of the decedent's estate.2 48 Therefore, as
the court explained, if defendant is ultimately successful in prosecuting
his counterclaim, the distributees or devisees of the decedent would be
adversely affected as to that part of the judgment for which plaintiff was
found personally liable as a joint tortfeasor.249
Defendants who wish to establish the personal liability of a plaintiff
who has brought suit in a fiduciary capacity are therefore reminded
that due to the substantial possibility of prejudice to the rights of
represented parties, courts will permit such claim to be asserted only by
means of a third-party complaint.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YoRK PRACTICE
Standing to litigate in suits against the civil service.
Standing, a judicially created concept resulting from a blend of
public policy considerations and discretionary judicial restraint, re-
stricts a court's power to render decisions. Recently, in Burke v. Sugar-
man,250 the Court of Appeals unanimously held that persons who pass
a civil service examination and are placed on an eligible list "have
standing to challenge unlawful appointments or designations to posi-
tions for which the list has been established." 25 1
Petitioners in Burke instituted a special proceeding pursuant to
CPLR article 78,252 seeking the removal of certain persons alleged to
have been unlawfully appointed to positions in the New York City
Department of Social Services. These employees had been promoted
from without the appropriate eligible list, in contravention of the
247 N.Y. Esr., PoWERs & TRuSts LAW § 5.4-4(a) (McKinney 1967) provides that the
damages are "exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's distributees and, when col-
lected, shall be distributed to the persons entitled thereto.
248 Id. § 11-3.3(a).
249 78 Misc. 2d at 481, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
250 35 N.Y.2d 39, 315 N.E.2d 772, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1974), rev'g 41 App. Div. 2d 1026,
344 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Ist Dep't 1973) (mem.).
251 35 N.Y.2d at 44, 315 N.E-2d at 774, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
252 See generally Fox, Reviewability of Quasi-Legislative Acts of Public Officials in
New York Under Article 78 of the CPLR, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 49 (1964); Weintraub,
Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action: From State
Writs to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 86 (1963).
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requirements of the state constitution,213 the Civil Service Law,254 and
the New York City Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations.255
In addition, petitioners sought the appointment of others from the
list to fill the positions in question.256 The proceeding was dismissed by
the Supreme Court, New York County, for failure to state a claim and
laches. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed.257
The facts, as accepted by the Court, reveal that each of the three
petitioners had passed a civil service promotional examination and had
been placed on an eligible list, ranking 222, 233, and 271, respectively.
The last promotion made from the list was of an eligible ranking 185.
From that time until the institution of the proceeding, 37 appointments
or designations were made without regard to the list.258 In reversing and
reinstating the petition, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "[e]ligibles
on a civil service list from which a position is to be filled are directly
and substantially affected by the failure to comply with the law."259
253 N.Y. CoNsr. art. V, § 6 declares in pertinent part:
Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and all of the civil
divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit
and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far
as practicable, shall be competitive ....
25 N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAW § 61 (McKinney 1978) provides in part:
Appointment or promotion from an eligible list to a position in the competitive
class shall be made by the selection of one of the three persons certified by the
appropriate dvil service commission as standing highest on such eligible list
who are willing to accept such appointment or promotion ....
255 N.Y.C. CiV. SEmV. CoNMI'N RuLEs & REGs. § 4.7.2 (July 20, 1971) provides for selec-
tion to be made from the list by grouping the eligibles in ranking groups of three.
250The Court expressed doubt that petitioners' request that promotions be made
from the eligible list-which had since expired- could be honored. 35 N.Y.2d at 45,
315 N.E.2d at 775, 358 N.Y.$.2d at 719. See Brief for Repondents at 7, Burke v. Sugarman,
35 N.Y.2d 89, 315 NE.2d 772, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1974), citing Carow v. Board of Educ.,
272 N.Y. 341, 6 N.E.2d 47 (1936) and Hurley v. Board of Educ., 270 N.Y. 275, 200 N.E. 818
(1936).
257 See 35 N.Y.2d 89, 40, 315 N.E.2d 772, 358 N.YS.2d 715 (1974).
The Court of Appeals, citing Cash v. Bates, 801 N.Y. 258, 261, 93 N.E2d 835, 836
(1950), reversed as to the issue of lathes, stating that "the doctrine of lahes has no
application, since the failure to comply with constitutional requirements for making ap-
pointments of eligibles to competitive positions is a continuing and constitutional wrong."
35 N.Y.2d at 45, 815 N.E.2d at 775, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
The Court failed to entertain respondents' contention that "petitioners had waived
the right to bring the court proceeding because of a then on-going arbitration pro-
ceeding," which was predicated upon a written waiver of the right to submit the dispute
to the courts. See Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Burke v. Sugarman, 85 N.Y.2d 39, 815
N.E.2d 772, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1974).
258 Presumably petitioners waited until the number of promotions allegedly made
without regard to the list had reached a number which would have insured consideration
of at least one of them, thereby establishing a concrete interest sufficient to meet the
requirements to bring suit. The Court, however, concluded that position on the eligible
list should not be determinative since denying standing to a person at the lower end of
the list "may well assure that his name will never be reached." 35 N.Y.2d at 44, 315
N.E2d at 774, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
259 Id. (emphasis added). See Hurley v. Board of Educ., 270 N.Y. 275, 279, 200 N.E.
1975]
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Writing for the Court, Chief Judge Breitel observed further that, as
litigants in such a proceeding, petitioners had brought "the kind of
interest that leads to full and vigorous presentation and exploration
of the issues involved." 2680
Some confusion still exists as to what constitutes an interest suffi-
cient to enable a petitioner to challenge unlawful administrative action
or inaction. Citing several earlier Court of Appeals' decisions, Chief
Judge Breitel noted the inconsistent determinations on standing in pro-
ceedings challenging administrative acts of the civil service. For ex-
ample, in Andresen v. Rice,26' the Court held that a petitioner who was
qualified to apply for a position in the civil service, and, more im-
portantly, was "a citizen and resident of the State," had standing to
compel competitive examinations for appointments and promotions
within the state police force.262 Citizen-taxpayer suits directed against
the civil service administration were given further impetus in Cash v.
Bates.263 There, the Court declared that petitioners, as "citizens and
taxpayers," were entitled to insist upon the enforcement of the civil
service laws as they had been interpreted by the Court of Appeals.2
In a later case, Donohue v. Cornelius,265 the Court, notwithstand-
ing Cash or Andresen, to which it notably made no reference, held that
a petitioner not personally aggrieved could not challenge the validity
of a governmental act solely on the basis of his status as a private citi-
zen.266 The Donohue Court cited as controlling St. Clair v. Yonkers
818, 820 (1936), wherein the Court stated that a petitioner did not gain "a vested right
to appointment" to a position by merely being placed on an eligible list. Standing, how-
ever, was not an issue in Hurley, an action for an injunction to restrain defendant from
making appointments from an expired list.
260 35 N.Y.2d at 44, 315 NXE.2d at 774, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
261 277 N.Y. 271, 14 NXE.2d 65 (1938) (4-2 decision).
262 Id. at 281, 14 N.E.2d at 69. The examinations in question were required by the
state constitution. See N.Y. CONSr. art. V, § 6, quoted in part in note 253 supra. Petitioner
in Andresen had not applied for a position but was only questioning the process used to
fill job vacancies. Thus, his status as a citizen and resident of the state was petitioner's
sole ground for standing. 277 N.Y. at 281, 14 N.E.2d at 69.
268 301 N.Y. 258, 93 N.E.2d 835 (1950) (6-1 decision).
264 Id. at 261, 93 N.E.2d at 836. Petitioners, disabled veterans who passed a civil
service examination, challenged the appointment of veterans who also passed the exami-
nation but who had no recognized disabilities. Such appointments, the petitioners argued,
were in violation of the state constitution as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Carey
v. Morton, 297 N.Y. 361, 79 NXE.2d 442 (1948). 301 N.Y. at 261-62, 93 N.E.d at 836-37.
265 17 N.Y.2d 390, 218 N.E.2d 285, 271 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1966) (unanimous decision).
266 Id. at 396-98, 218 N.E.2d at 287-88, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35. Donohue, a member
of the State Police, brought an action questioning the validity of a civil service examina-
tion which, at the commencement of the action, he had not yet taken. By the time his
appeal was heard, he had successfully passed the exam but had subsequently been dis-
missed from the State Police for cause. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded, claiming
standing as a private citizen and taxpayer. Id. at 395-96, 218 N.E.2d at 286-87, 271
N.Y.S.2d at 233-34.
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Raceway, Inc., 267 a taxpayer suit not involving the civil service, wherein
the Court denied standing to the petitioner who was not otherwise
personally aggrieved. 268
Criticizing the rationales of Cash and Donohue as having been
broader than required by the facts,269 the Burke Court avoided a defini-
tive declaration as to how, if at all, those decisions were to be reconciled.
The Court chose not to address the question of whether a party would
have standing solely as a citizen and taxpayer in this suit against the
civil service since such a determination was not required by the facts.
Even the more restrictive interpretation of standing set forth in the
Donohue case, the Court observed, would not control the status of the
petitioners in Burke as they had not brought their action solely as
citizens or taxpayers, but as members of the civil service who had taken
the examination in question before commencement of their action.270
Moreover, the Court noted, standing, which is "largely of judicial
creation,... should be expanded rather than contracted."2 71
Burke, leaving no doubt that persons who pass a promotional
267 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963) (4-3 decision), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 970 (1964). St. Clair was overruled, however, in Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d
361 (1975), wherein citizens and taxpayers were granted standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of legislation authorizing expenditure of state funds.
268 The no standing for mere taxpayers rule, as set forth in St. Clair, had been
applied by the Court in a long line of decisions. See Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome
County, 18 N.Y. 155, 163 (1858) (fear of excessive litigation); Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212
N.Y. 520, 537, 106 N.E. 675, 680 (1914) (courts not guardians of the people at large);
Bull v. Stichman, 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661 (1948) (necessity of personal injury). See
also Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 971-72, 259 N.E.2d 484, 485, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15,
15-16 (1970) (mem.) (standing denied to petitioners as citizens, taxpayers, or assemblymen
to challenge the validity of an appropriation bill). For an in-depth discussion of tax-
payers' suits in New York see Quirk, Standing to Sue in New York, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
429 (1973). See also Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAav. L.
Rv. 1265, 1277-79 (1961).
Legislation has given the taxpayer a right to bring suit under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. Smv. LAw § 102(1) (McKinney 1973) (taxpayers' action to restrain
payment of salary or compensation to an appointee); N.Y. GEN. MUrIC. LAW § 51 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1974) (taxpayer's action to restrain illegal official acts). But see Slavin v. Mc-
Guire, 205 N.Y. 84, 88, 98 N.E. 405, 406 (1912), quoting In re Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 430, 440,
96 N.E. 87, 89 (1911) (application of General Municipal Law only when act affects "'the
estate, funds, or property rights of the municipality.' "); Di Paola v. City of Glen Cove,
21 App. Div. 2d 678, 678-79, 250 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230-31 (2d Dep't) (mem.), appeal dismissed,
14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E2d 372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1964) (mem.) (challenge of validity of
city budget may not be maintained under General Municipal Law). Newly enacted article
7-A of the N.Y. STATE FmN. LAw, ch. 827, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1307 (McKinney), estab-
lishes in more definitive language citizen-taxpayer standing in actions challenging the
disposition of state funds and properties as illegal or unconstitutional.
269 35 N.Y.2d at 43, 315 N.E.2d at 773, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
270 Id. at 44-45, 315 N.E.2d at 774-75, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
271 Id. at 45, 315 N.E2d at 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 719, citing Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28
N.Y.2d 439, 443, 271 N.E.2d 530, 533, 322 N.YS.2d 687, 688, 690 (1971) (mem.) (Breitel, J.,
dissenting) and St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 79-80, 192 N.Y.2d 15, 17-19,
242 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45-48 (1963) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
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examination have standing to challenge the validity of appointments or
designations for which the examination has been intended, also seems
to establish that those who fail a promotional examination are suffi-
ciently affected to challenge the validity of such examinations.& 2 The
standing of a mere citizen and taxpayer in a suit against the civil service,
however, requires further clarification.
272 See 35 N.Y.2d at 44, 315 N.E.2d at 774, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (dictum).
